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A Legacy of Strife: Rebellious Slaves in Sixteenth-Century Panamá
Ignacio Gallup-Díaz
Bryn Mawr College

A group of sixteenth-century chroniclers bestowed the name War of Vallano1
upon what they interpreted to be a single, specific, self-contained event : a major uprising
carried out by rebel slaves -- whom they termed cimarrones2 – that wracked the isthmus
of Panamá in 1555-6. This essay will investigate the contemporary descriptions of the
event with the goal of illuminating how an agreed-upon understanding of the rebellion,
specifically a triumphalist interpretation that glossed over many of the actions of Vallano
himself, became the standard account re-told and embellished by several writers who
fashioned chronicles that included descriptions of the uprising.
Several chroniclers writing in the period between 1580 and 1620 embedded a
narrative of the War of Vallano in their wide-ranging histories of the Indies. Juan de
Castellanos devoted several lines of his massive heroic poem Elegías de varones ilustres
de Indias to it; 3 Toribio de Ortiguera described the event in his Jornada del Rio
Marañón;4 Pedro de Aguado devoted several chapters of his Recopilación Historial to the

1

The sources render the name as “Vallano,” “Ballano,” “Bayano,” and “Bayamo.” As
can be ascertained from my title, I prefer to use “Vallano.”
2
Providing a possible etymology of the term cimarron, Carlos Federico Guillot, Negros
Rebeldes y Negros Cimarrones, (Buenos Aires: Fariñas Editores, 1961), p. 38, posits the
importance of the word “cima,” a mountain’s highest point. Cimarrones would be translated as
‘men of the high mountain.’
3
Juan Castellanos, Primera Parte de las elegías de varones ilustres de Indias, (Madrid,
1589). For a complete modern edition see Miguel Antonio Caro, (ed.), Elegías de varones
ilustres de Indias, 4 vols., (Bogotá, 1955).
4
Toribio de Ortiguera, Jornada del Rio Marañón, composed between 1581 and 1586, was
published in M. Serrano y Sanz, (ed.), Nueva Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. 15,
“Historiadores de Indias,” part 2, (Madrid, 1909).

War; 5 and Garcilaso de la Vega (known as “El Inca”) wrote of Vallano in his Historia
General del Perú.6
My aim is to explore the accounts of the event in order to provide an analysis of it
that is more satisfactory than those that have appeared previously. In doing so I will
investigate the methods and motivations of the chroniclers who worked to lessen
Vallano’s central role in the action as they fit the event within their broader narratives of
Spanish conquest. As I intend to prove, the collation of these sources does not allow the
researcher to establish the full range of facts as they occurred. My method, rather, is to
establish which of the chroniclers came closest to describing the event in a way that
approximated Spanish imperial practices.

Antonio de Alsedo, writing in a geographical compendium published in the late
1780s,7 provided a helpful thumbnail entry for “Bayano.” As a work of the European
Enlightenment, Alsedo’s entries affected an objective, fact-based tone, with the author’s
apparent goal being the deployment of his considerable knowledge to confront and dispel
the myths and half-truths that had accreted to the peoples and the place-names of the
Indies.
“A curvaceous river in the reign of Tierra Firme, in the province of Panamá,”
Alsedo began, and, proceeding to more detailed information, continued:
5

Pedro de Aguado, Recopilación Historial, compiled in the mid-1580s. I consulted the
well-edited and introduced Juan Friede, (ed.), Fray Pedro Aguado, Recopilación Historial, 4
vols., ([Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, tomos 31-4], Bogotá, 1956-57).
6
Garcilaso “el Inca” de la Vega, Historia General del Perú, la segunda parte de los
comentarios reales, (1617), tr. H.V. Livermore, 2 vols., (University of Texas Press, 1966).
7
Antonio de Alsedo, Diccionario geográfico histórico de las Indias occidentales o
America, 5 vols., (Madrid: Benito Cano, 1786–1789). For a well-introduced modern edition, see
Ciriaco Pérez-Bustamente, (ed.), Diccionario, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vols. 205-208,
(Madrid, 1967).
2

It has this name from a black man, a slave and fugitive from his master, to
whom there aggregated many others of this class, making themselves feared
in those mountains due to the atrocities that they executed upon the
Spaniards who fell into their hands. Their actions reached such a level that
the Viceroy of Peru, Marquis de Cañete, then passing to his realms in the
south, commissioned captain Pedro de Ursúa to destroy and punish those
grave enemies. This he accomplished in a long and difficult campaign in
1555, leaving in perpetuity the memory of the accomplishment in the name
of the river.8
The message is clear: after reading Alsedo’s entry, it would hardly seem justified for an
educated, late eighteenth-century Spaniard consulting the dictionary to view the event as
a war at all.
Alsedo meted out a final telling insult in his discussion of the event, going so far
as to inform his readers that the name ‘Bayano’ graced a Panamánian river not to mark
the freed slave’s own noteworthy achievements, but rather to enhance the memory of
Pedro de Ursúa, the Spanish soldier who had ultimately vanquished him. In sum,
Alsedo’s entry provides proof that the sixteenth-century Spanish chroniclers of the event
succeeded in their rhetorical goal. Their writings transformed Vallano from an active
historical agent, someone with the ability to instigate and shape events, into a passive
figure who, in the end, was judged to have contributed little to the accounts of the
rebellion that bears his name.

The chroniclers whom I will discuss preferred to treat the War of Vallano as a
single event: Vallano rebelled against the crown, and the representatives of the crown
vanquished him and his followers in 1556. Since Vallano was the supreme leader of the
insurgents, it follows that his defeat marked the clear end of the insurgency. However,
8

Alsedo, Diccionario, pp.133-4 of the 1967 edition.
3

documents produced by Spanish officials in Panamá tell a different story. While Vallano
may well have been vanquished in 1556, officials operating in the 1580s – long after the
rebel’s death – still wrestled with the problem of uncontrollable rebel slaves.
Rather than decisive battles, a series of treaties brought these rebellions to a more
clear-cut conclusion at the close of the century. The treaties recognized a group of
leaders of newly-chartered, free black towns. These men, in concert with imperial
bureaucrats, practiced a form of contested and erratic colonial collusion. Spanish
officials worked to delineate and enforce the duties and norms of behavior that they
expected from Afro-Panamanian leaders; the free blacks equally endeavored to define
what it meant to be free, black, and the leader of a chartered town in the Spanish empire.
At present, our interpretations of how this process evolved have been guided by the
points of view of the Spaniards who attempted to control the situation.
The process of Afro-Spanish collusion has been partially hidden from researchers
due to the way that local Spanish officials described the cimarrones’ pacification to their
superiors. In the officials’ descriptions, they conveyed a triumphalist account,
confidently portrayed themselves dictating terms to the defeated rebel slaves and forcibly
reducing them to a ‘civilized’ state. However, a close reading of the actual agreements,
and careful study of the accounts relating the peopling of the free black towns, reveal that
both sides contributed to the process in equal measure.9
On Spain’s contested imperial frontiers, the process could be replicated with
rebellious peoples of African and indigenous descent, comprising a core element of
9

For a discussion of the process, see my review of C. Jopling’s 1994 compilation of
Panamanian documents titled Indios y negros en Panama en los siglos XVI y XVII XVII:
Selecciones de los documentos del Archivo General de Indias, (Plumsock Mesoamerican Studies;
Antigua: Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamerica, 1994) in the Hispanic American
Historical Review 83 (2003): 581-3.
4

Atlantic history, which J.H. Elliott aptly described “as the history … of the creation,
destruction, and recreation of communities as a result of the movement, across the
Atlantic basin, of people, commodities, cultural practices, and ideas.” 10

Historiographical Issues
The historian of the rebel slaves of colonial Panamá confronts several difficulties.
The first involves the status of imperial Panamá itself. William Paterson, one of the
central figures behind a late-seventeenth century Scottish attempt to colonize eastern
Panamá, grandly called the region the “door of the seas and key to the universe.”11 Since
it served as a key trade route and transportation hub, Panamá was vitally important to the
Spanish empire. The Isthmus needed to be held not for its Indian population, nor for its
precious minerals, though it had both in some abundance. Rather, the isthmus of Panamá
was a core component of the Spanish empire because it served as the literal door that,
when opened, connected the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In 1513 Vasco Núñez de
Balboa, with the assistance of indigenous allies, had discovered the trans-isthmian route
connecting the oceans.12
Since Spanish ships could not navigate around Cape Horn until the seventeenth
century, everything and everyone passing to or from the southern realm of Perú and,
10J.H. Elliott, “Atlantic History: A Circumnavigation,” the “Afterward” to D. Armitage
and M.J. Braddick. (eds.), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, (Palgrave, 2002), pp. 233-249.
11
I treat the Scottish colonization attempt in chapters 4 and 5 of my Door of the Seas and
Key to the Universe: Indian Politics and Imperial Rivalry in the Darién, 1640-1750, (Columbia
University Press, 2001). The text was first published as an electronic monograph (accessible
online at http://www.gutenberg-e.org/ ); a print edition appeared under the Columbia University
Press imprint in 2005.
12
The standard account of this portion of Panamá’s history remains Kathleen Romoli,
Balboa of Darién: Discoverer of the Pacific, (Doubleday, 1953). Also of interest for the period
of discovery are C.O. Sauer, The Early Spanish Main, (University of California Press, 1966); and
Mary Helms, Ancient Panamá: Chiefs in Search of Power, (University of Texas Press, 1979).

5

later, Quito, had to experience, as a portion of the journey, an overland trek across the
camino real that traversed the Isthmus of Panamá.13 Consequently, a sojourn in Panamá
became a part of the life-experience of hundreds of Spanish officials, missionaries, and
merchants. Consequently, men of political importance -- in addition to missionaries in
possession of literary ambitions – developed strong opinions regarding the region’s
Indians (truculent and rebellious) and African slaves (rebellious, brutal, difficult to
subdue) and were willing to comment, write, and act upon their Panamánian experience.
Panamá occupied a precarious position in the Spanish system. Men and goods
needed to pass freely across the isthmus in order for the empire to operate with some
level of useful cohesion.14 However, after the conquest of the Inka state in Peru in 1532,
the Spanish population of Panamá diminished as the richer realm siphoned off unattached
adventurers. Furthermore, economic and social development in New Spain to the north
and Peru to the south soon relegated Panamá to the position of a tertiary economy reliant
on shipping and the transportation of goods from other realms across the isthmus.15 .
(One of its cities, Nombre de Dios, came to life only when the Spanish fleet was
anchored there.) By the latter part of the sixteenth century English and French pirates,
recognizing Spanish vulnerability at the isthmian chokepoint, stepped up their disruptive
attacks, establishing a durable model for future intruders by coordinating their activities

13

The camino real is well described in Roland Hussey, “Spanish Colonial Trails in
Panamá,” Revista de História de América 6 (1939): 47–74.
14
The lengths taken by Spanish officials to improve the defenses of the isthmus are
documented in Christopher Ward, “Imperial Panamá: Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian
America, 1550–1750.” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Florida, 1988); and in his monograph Imperial
Panama: Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America, 1550-1800, (University of New Mexico
Press, 1993).
15
Panamá’s tertiary economy is explored in Antonio Castillero Calvo, Economía terciaria
y sociedad: Panamá siglos XVI y XVII, (Panamá: Impresa de la Nación/Instituto Nacional de
Cultura, 1980).
6

with the region’s indigenous people and African rebels.16 Panamá, a core region in the
Spanish imperial system, possessed in its meager population and impossible-to-defend
borders two decidedly peripheral qualities.

More importantly, the reason we can speak of a historical figure named Vallano at
all is the result of a historical accident, an oddity in the generation of a set of historical
sources. The chroniclers who described the initial slave uprisings of Panamá, and
grouped these events into a single War of Vallano, did so for a very specific reason. For
them, the War was a brief episode in the eventful life-story of Don Pedro de Ursúa, the
shrewd, Odyssean conquistador who vanquished Vallano. For, after dealing with the
fugitive slaves of Panamá, Ursúa was enjoined by the viceroy to embark upon his
infamous expedition to explore the Amazon River. That journey produced the
spectacular mutiny of Lope de Aguirre, who had Ursúa murdered after wresting the
leadership of the expedition from him. These events were shocking to Spanish
sensibilities, and they were the subject of considerable commentary.17
Consequently, the chroniclers who deal with Ursúa’s activities in the Isthmus of
Panamá bracket the War of Vallano as an early, minor incident in the conquistador’s
eventful life. Although his interactions with the rebel slaves are worthy of mention, the
focal point of Ursúa’s life is deemed to be the momentous Amazonian events that took
place in his life after he departed from Panamá. The War of Vallano is clearly the
introductory matter that prepares the reader for the discussion of the more important later
16

For a recent study of sixteenth-century pirate activity that makes use of English, French,
Dutch, and Spanish sources, see Harry Kelsey, Sir Francis Drake: The Queen’s Pirate, (Yale UP,
1998), esp. pp. 40-68; 240-280; and 367-392.
17
Emiliano Jos, Jornada de Ursúa a el Dorado, (Huesca, [Spain], 1927) provides a
bibliographic guide to the accounts of the fateful expedition.
7

occurrences. In this essay it is my intention to work against these ‘centripetal forces’
acting to pull the narrative and the interpretations of events down familiar, problematic
paths.
The African rebel slaves whom the Spanish termed cimarrones occupy an
ambiguous place in the historiography of colonial Panamá. Due to their stout opposition
to Spanish imperial designs, they, and Vallano as their most effective leader, have made
their way into the books used to teach history to children in Panamá.18 An African
American community in present-day Panamá considers itself descended from the
cimarrones, and the group’s language, rituals, and dances have been the object of tourism
and scholarly study for quite some time.19 However, the rebels’ color and their continent
of origin have been coupled with the assumption that their actions against the Spanish
were simply the result of the Africans following their rebellious “natures,” a conclusion
which has led many commentators to heap both subtle and outright scorn upon them.20
The rebellious bands of sixteenth-century Africans at war with the Spanish could
be accommodated to a textbook narrative that frames the colonial period as a precursor to
18

The cimarrones are given a central place in the colonial portion of Juan B. Sosa and
Enrique J. Arce’s seminal Compendio de Historia de Panamá, (Panamá, 1911); for the place this
text holds in the Panamanian educational curriculum, see Carlos Manuel Gasteazoro’s
introduction to Compendio de historia de Panamá: Edición facsímil de la de 1911, (Panamá,
1977).
19
For an informative study of the Afro-Panamánian successor community, see John M.
Lipski, “The Negros Congos of Panamá: Afro-Hispanic Creole Language and Culture,” Journal
of Black Studies 16 (1986): 409-428; P. Drolet, “The Congo Ritual of Northeastern Panamá: An
Afro-American Expressive Structure of Cultural Adaptation,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Illinois,
1980); Ronald R. Smith, “The Society of Los Congos of Panamá: Afro-American dance theatre,”
in Adrienne Lanier Seward, (ed.), The Role of Afro-American Folklore in the Teaching of the Arts
and the Humanities, (Indiana UP, 1979), pp. 118-164; and Victor M. Franceschi, “Folklore
nacional: los negros congos en Panamá,” Lotería 5:51 (Feb. 1960): 90-107.
20
Armando Fortune is the lone exception to this pervasive problem in the historiography.
See his thought-provoking essays: “Bayano, precursor de la libertad de los esclavos.” Lotería 234
(Aug. 1975): 1–15; and “Los negros cimarrones en Tierra Firme y su lucha por la libertad.”
Lotería 171 (Feb. 1970): 17–43; 172 (Mar. 1970): 32–53; 173 (Apr. 1970): 16–40; and 174 (May
1970): 46–65.
8

Panamanian nationhood. However, the cimarrones’ acts of war have primarily been
interpreted as atavistic, barbaric and pointlessly blood-thirsty rampages. A narrative that
depicts the attainment of national identity as a supreme achievement ultimately has little
space for hapless, accidental historical actors of African descent who were, it seemed,
more interested in theft than they were in contributing to Panamanian national identity.
Problematically, the rebellions of the cimarrones have been depicted as doomed
to fail: after all, the slaves’ pursuit of the atavistic goal of a return to Africa and the
resumption of what some researchers deemed a more natural, simple, animistic or African
way of life was, by definition, unattainable. In sum, previous depictions of the uprisings
and the Africans who took part in them have been marred by disdain for the rebels;21 an
uncritical acceptance of the Spanish descriptions of their actions and motivations;22 or
pseudo-sociological interpretations of their favorable adaptation to the humid rain-forest
environment due to their natural predisposition to it.23
Writing soon after the end of the Second World War, John E. Minter encapsulated
the racialism that has marred some of the modern interpretations of the rebellion.24
Minter’s twelfth chapter, titled “Black Magic,” begins by describing the condition of
Panamá’s Africans as “a never-ending trudge along the Camino del Oro …” This is an
unobjectionable start, though the paragraph’s conclusion soon reveals the author’s
problematic assumptions: “[there] appeared increasing numbers of black savages [sic]
21

Carlos Restrepo Canal, “Leyes de Manumisión,” in Eduardo Posada, La esclavitud en
Colombia, (Bogotá, 1933).
22
This trait mars Guillot’s novelistic and informative Negros Rebeldes; Fernando
Romero, “Los negros Panameños en el siglo XVI,” Boletín de la Academia Panameña de
Historia 2d series, no. 1, 1943, pp. 1-34; and Luis A. Diez Castillo, Los cimarrones y los negros
antillanos en Panamá, 2d ed., (Panamá, 1981).
23
This is most prevalent in Guillot, Negros Rebeldes; while sympathetic to the
cimarrones, he errs in this regard.
24
J.E Minter, The Chagres: River of the Westward Passage, (Rinehart, 1948).
9

from Africa, their naked bodies scored with the welts and tattoos of the Congo country,
their brilliant white teeth filed to shark-like points as the unfailing badge of
cannibalism.”25
Attitudes similar to Minter’s can be found throughout the historiography and
aome modern historians and anthropologists have done little better at interpreting and
explaining the motivations of the rebellious Panamánian slaves, arguing that their
combative actions against the Spanish were the result of the group’s near-biological
desire to revert to their ‘former state’. The prevailing assumption is that since the
cimarrones were Africans transported against their will to the Americas, they ‘naturally’,
reverted to purely African modes of thought and being upon attaining their freedom. It is
indisputable that the cimarrones, upon freeing themselves from slavery, created
communities whose cultural, religious, and political practices were deeply influenced by
their inhabitants’ African culture. However, the process through which these
communities and practices were created was a historical one that did not take place in a
vacuum. The cultural, linguistic, and religious factors that shaped these communities
were more varied and complex than previous scholars of Panamá have been willing to
allow. In a profound and fundamental sense, the cimarrones were both African and
American.26

25

Minter, Chagres, p. 109. In an endnote explaining his choice of terms, Minter divulged
some revealing information when he stated “[f]or want of a better word, I have violated my
Southern raising by the indiscriminate use … of the word “Yankee” to distinguish United States
citizens … .” (p. 392)
26
For a nuanced discussion of the interaction of culture, language, history, and geography
in the creation of a distinctly African-American culture, see Richard Price and Sidney Mintz, The
Birth of African American Culture: An Anthropological Perspective, (Beacon, 1992). R. Price,
Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas, 2d ed., (Johns Hopkins, 1996)
provides a ground-breaking collection of articles with a broad geographical range. Of equal
10

I argue that the cimarrones were not endeavoring to achieve a real or figurative
return to Africa. Neither were they trying to fashion a replica of Africa in the Americas.
Having fought for and attained their freedom, they resisted those who attempted to reenslave them; they attacked the economic interests of the Spanish empire; and they
assisted the enemies of that empire. Even while hunted by their enemies, the cimarrones
established complex communities that integrated military and political leadership,
religious practitioners, and liberated families. The Spanish termed these communities
palenques.27 Moreover, after the fighting ended, leaders of several of the rebel bands
accepted Spanish offers that their people incorporate specific towns and transform
themselves into loyal subjects of the Spanish crown. In doing so they created a series of
free black settlements, sites of political, cultural, and linguistic admixture.28

The Chroncilers: Framing a Narrative
Beatriz Pastor has described two strands of historical writing emerging from the
Americas following the conquest.29 The first was a triumphalist one that highlighted the
heroic actions of the outnumbered Spanish conquistadors as they faced the armies of
well-organized indigenous powers.30 The second strand Pastor terms the narratives of
failure. These were not tales describing straightforward, pre-ordained victories over
importance are Price’s two monographs: First-Time: The Historical Vision of an Afro-American
People, (Johns Hopkins UP, 1983); and Alabi’s World, (Johns Hopkins UP, 1990).
27
The term ‘palenque’ is discussed by José Franco, “Maroons and Slave Rebellions in the
Spanish Territories,” in Price, (ed.), Maroon Societies, pp. 35-49.
28
Maria del Carmen Mena García, La sociedad de Panamá en el siglo XVI, (Sevilla,
1984), chapter V, “Reducción de los negros cimarrones: Santa Cruz la Real y Santiago del
Príncipe,” pp. 422-426 provides a useful corrective treatment.
29
Pastor, The Armature of Conquest: Spanish Accounts of the Discovery of America,
(Stanford UP, 1992), pp. 105-129.
30
Pastor places portions of Columbus’s and Cortez’s letters in this group, along with
Bernal Díaz’s History of New Spain.
11

American non-believers. Instead, they described utterly lost Spanish explorers
overcoming difficult situations by dint of equal parts luck and their wits.31
Most of the chroniclers described Ursúa’s early exploits in Panamá in triumphalist
terms, a strategy that allowed them to present a dramatic and sharp contrast to their
depictions of the fateful Amazonian expedition which followed -- an event that could
only properly be framed as a narrative of failure. The ease with which Vallano was
vanquished is contrasted with the arduousness of the Amazonian expedtion.
One chronicler’s account of the War of Vallano dissented from the triumphalist
tone adopted by the other writers. Garcilaso’s description of the rebellion injected a note
of realism into the collection of narratives that described the War of Vallano. My claim
that Garcilaso’s account represents a departure in the framing of the confrontation
between Vallano and Ursúa does not include an argument that Garcilaso’s text be
accepted as an unmediated source. My contention is that Garcilaso’s description, in
incorporating several elements that reflected the actual process at work as the Spanish
attempted to pacify their imperial frontiers, provided a discussion closer to what actually
transpired on the ground than any other chronicler.

Castellanos
The poet Juan de Castellanos provided a terse account of the rebellion, and was
the most blunt in his triumphalist tone.32 What follows is his succinct description of
Ursúa’s heroic actions in Panamá:

31

Pastor categorizes Cabeza de Vaca’s narrative as a member of this group, as well as the
accounts of the mutiny of Lope de Aguirre during the Amazonian expedition. However, she also
sees Cortez’s fifth letter as transitional, and finds the beginnings of the rhetoric of travail and
failure in Columbus’ first letter.
12

[Ursúa] residió con ciertas compañías
En el Nombre de Dios algunos días
Donde recogió copia de soldados
Para los ejercicios de la guerra,
Y allí desbarató negros alzados
Que estaban hechos fuertes en la sierra;
Los cuales, por ser muchos y esforzados,
Ponían en temor toda la tierra,
Priendoles á su rey dicho Ballano,
Aunque tenia poderosa mano.33
(Ursúa resided with certain people/
for several days in Nombre de Dios/
Where he gathered a company of soldiers/
In order to take part in battle/
And there he set to flight the rebel blacks/
Who had made themselves strong in the mountains;/
They, being powerful and strong/
Had terrified all of the land,/
He imprisoned their king Ballano,/
Even though he had a powerful hand.)
In Castellanos’ account, Vallano is afforded a “powerful hand.” However, it’s clear that
the poet deployed this phrase not to praise Vallano, but rather as a means to validate
Ursúa’s own achievement. Africans can certainly wield strength, as Vallano did, but no
matter how powerful they might become, they cannot confront a Spanish warrior at the
head of an organized military force. This account is best described as a mention; it is the
next chronicler who begins the process of shaping a narrative.

32

Juan Castellanos, Primera Parte de las elegías de varones ilustres de Indias, (Madrid,
1589). For a complete modern edition see Miguel Antonio Caro, (ed.), Elegías de varones
ilustres de Indias, 4 vols., (Bogotá, 1955).
33
Caro, (ed.), Castellanos, Elegías, vol. 1, pp. 611-612.
13

Ortiguera
In his first chapter, the chronicler Toribio de Ortiguera described Ursúa’s
Panamá-based activities.34 Ortiguera’s account, the paradigmatic version of the rebellion,
described in strong, direct language how viceroy Cañete
sent Ursúa to Nombre de Dios in Tierra Firme, where a squadron of black
cimarrones operated. These cimarrones were nothing more than bandits
who inflicted great harm on the cities of Nombre de Dios and Panamá.
They freed blacks from the service of their Spanish masters, taking them to
the mountains in which they lived … . They took goods from the travelers
on the road that connected the two cities, making it impossible to live or
do anything in those territories. The cimarrones had an army numbering
more than 1,200 men and women; among this number were a king and a
bishop. Through great industry captain Ursúa in short order conquered,
killed, and threw to the dogs a great quantity of these bad people. He
imprisoned their king, named Vallano, and sent him as prisoner to the
King. He exacted a great and public justice upon the rebels, sending them
in chains to Nombre de Dios and Panamá, where they were thrown to the
dogs and torn apart while still alive so that the slaves there could see this
and know that the same fate awaited them if they left the service of their
masters. This was very necessary since in that land there are no other
servants but the slaves. … Due to the actions of Pedro de Ursúa many of
those escaped slaves returned to service in Nombre de Dios and Panamá,
and people could travel the road unperturbed and in tranquility—no one
was obstructed, robbed or assaulted, things returned to the way they were
in the past.35
Ortiguera united all of the necessary elements in his description: a great threat
emerged; the enemy amassed in large numbers and possessing the ability to increase
those numbers through the liberation of their enslaved brethren; and Pedro de Ursúa
entered the fray and got the job done. The final sentence of Ortiguera’s account is the
most telling: with the rebellion crushed, things returned to their former state.

34

Toribio de Ortiguera, Jornada del Rio Marañón, composed between 1581 and 1586,
was published in M. Serrano y Sanz, (ed.), Nueva Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. 15,
“Historiadores de Indias,” part 2, (Madrid, 1909).
35
Ortiguera, Jornada, pp. 307-8.
14

Ortiguera made no attempt to paper over the brutality involved in the restoration
of order in Panamá. He described rebel bands that included men, women, and, it is
presumed, children, all of whom were subject to the same ghastly treatment when
Spanish exemplary justice was meted out. However, a slight note of defensiveness
entered the account as Ortiguera justified the killing of the captured rebels by having
dogs tear them apart while they still lived. “This was very necessary,” he remarked,
arguing that circumstances unique to Panamá made this the only possible course of
action.
Following up on this argument, Ortiguera offered a balm to any of his readers
who might have tender consciences regarding the rebels’ rough treatment. The brutality
visited upon the captives was necessary in the larger scheme of things, since it restored to
the Spaniards the ability to carry out their appointed work in the Americas. Such a
concentrated exercise of brutality clearly required the author’s explanation, but it was
inarguably justified since it erased chaos and disorder and left the free movement of
goods and people in its wake.
Castellanos focused exclusively upon Ursúa’s heroism, while mentioning the
bravery of Ursúa’s opponent, Vallano. Ortiguera, on the other hand, produced an actual
narrative of the War. In his account, the rebellion of the cimarrones was provided a
definable beginning, middle, and end. In addition, the writer articulated an ideological
justification for the endeavor and the methods used. Finally, the action of the narrative,
although set into chaotic motion by the African slaves, was sure-handedly managed and
brought to a permanent conclusion through the decisive actions of a Spaniard.
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Aguado
The most extensive description of the War of Vallano is contained in a chronicle
compiled by Pedro de Aguado.36 The account of Ursúa’s expedition against the
cimarrones occupies four chapters of the text. Aguado’s version of the story is unique not
only due to its length. Although the elements that underpinned Ortiguera’s concise core
account were present, details are added, characters are fleshed out, and ideological points
are made in a more explicit fashion. In fact, this text provided the most detailed
prosecutorial and ideological case against the cimarrones, presenting extensive evidence
of their grave crimes. Not only have the cimarrones transgressed against their lawful
masters by fleeing, they added to their problems by committing wanton acts of
despoliation and robbery against the Crown and its representatives. Most importantly,
under the tutelage of a man called ‘the bishop,’ the rebels reverted to idolatry. They had
even taken up new ritual practices that were nothing more than crude mockeries of
Catholic rituals. This was a very grave charge, since, it was argued, the slaves were
Christians who had been baptized by their owners. Their mass reversion to idolatry made
them not only rebels against the state but religious apostates as well.
To substantiate this claim, the text included descriptions of the cimarrones’
religious practices. Summing up his revulsion, the author stated “their bishop imitates
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the celebration of the mass.”37 Other sacraments were also simulated, and, the author
implied, debased and mocked. Several researchers interested in the life-experiences of
the Afro-Panamanians have uncritically read this description as a factual eyewitness
account of what the cimarrones did when they worshipped.38 However, my contention is
that the description is a reflection of what the Spanish imperialists believed -- and wished
for others to believe -- about the derivative and deformed nature of the rebels’ religious
practices. The description of the African bishop’s sacramental practices is of clear
interest to the historian nonetheless. Although its ethnohistorical value is limited, the text
serves as a marker of the broader frameworks and typologies available to the chroniclers
as they condemned the rebels in print.39
In addition to apostasy, the author added usurpation of authority and
miscegenation to the charges against the rebels, claiming that they had
fortified themselves in a town of Indians named Caricua, whose villagers
they have placed under their own subjection with rigorous violence, taking
their women and daughters and mixing and involving themselves with
them … producing a different kind of people … called zambahigos, as they
are people who don’t merit the use of the honorable name mulatto.40
In this account the confrontation with the region’s rebellious ex-slaves is framed as a
humanitarian act in favor of the region’s hard-pressed indigenous peoples, and an
assertion of a brand of tempered racial purity. While the racial mixtures overseen by the
Spanish are afforded an ‘honorable name,’ those taking place under the auspices of the
rebels generate ‘a different kind of people.’
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In the end, it is clear that the chronicler believed that the major crime Vallano had
committed was that of pride. The ex-slave held an inflated opinion of himself – one so
elevated that it outstripped the reality of the situation. The writer deemed the slave’s
usurpation of honor and authority intolerable, and knew that his readers would as well.
He described how Vallano imperiously “constrained and forced the governor of Panamá
and Nombre de Dios, to treat and negotiate with him on several occasions, as if the lands
he ranged upon were his by descent and the Spanish had but usurped them from him.”41
Aguado had Ursúa reiterate this charge in a speech made to his men moments before the
capture of Vallano.
The conquistador planned to take Vallano prisoner at a meal convened to
celebrate a negotiated peace agreed to by the opposing forces. This would, of course,
occur while the men met under a sign of truce. Feeling the need to explain his
motivations Aguado has Ursúa make the following speech:
Since these are fugitive and traitorous slaves, purchased and kept with our
own money, we have license to use whatever craft necessary in order to
capture and remit them to the servitude of those who once owned them …
This band of low-born blacks, acting against all laws divine and human,
pretend not only to make themselves lords of this land, where they were
neither they nor any of their kin were born nor raised … and constitute
amongst themselves a King and Lord.42
In Aguado’s rendition, Ursúa’s expedition followed close upon the heels of
several others that had returned to Nombre de Dios after having failed to pacify the
rebels. The cimarrones ranged through the mountains and countryside with such ease
that the Spanish forces simply could not keep up with them. Ursúa’s expedition was
different: he was able to coordinate his forces, resupply them by boat, factors presented
41
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as decisive to his success. In addition, the author highlights another element crucial to
the conquistador: Ursúa understood that Vallano, though powerful, was not a man worthy
of honorable treatment. This insight enabled Ursúa to succeed where the others had
failed. Tactics that could not be deployed against an honorable foe could be used to their
full effect to subdue Vallano and his people.
The chronicler wished the reader to understand that in order to succeed against a
barbarous foe, barbaric methods were not just condoned, but had to be actively
encouraged. A planned battle disrupted Ursúa’s “feast.” The Spanish forces struck down
or captured the bulk of Vallano’s forces. Having broken his foe’s army, Ursúa‘s first
impulse was to take to the field and wipe out the straggling remnants of the rebel band.
However, the conquistador realized that due to the Africans’ intimate knowledge of the
countryside -- this would be a difficult proposition. Continued military operations would
exhaust his men, consume his supplies, and dissipate his wealth. Ursúa therefore offered
Vallano, now a prisoner, a deal: the remaining cimarrones would be pardoned, granted a
place to settle, and would be left in peace. In return, they would be required to find and
return any slave that escaped from his owner in Nombre de Dios or Panamá City within
three days time. In Aguado’s account, this proved to be an offer the rebels could not
refuse. In closing, Vallano and several African captains were kept as hostages to ensure
the peace.43
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Garcilaso
Writing a decade later, Garcilaso “el Inca” de la Vega provided a notable variant to the
more ideologically driven descriptions of his chronicle-writing peers.44 His narrative
came closest to describing the actual manner in which real world imperial officials dealt
with intractable problems at the edges of the empire. If one wanted to encapsulate the
kind of imperial strategy that Spanish officials actually pursued on their frontiers – one
that adapted to local conditions and strategic realities – Garcilaso’s description could
serve. Spanish forces did not smite down the forces of chaos and apostasy with a single
blow. “El Inca” depicted the negotiated compromises that officials necessarily made
when they could not exterminate their foes on the battlefield.
In Garcilaso’s account, the rebels could not be destroyed in battle. Negotiation
and co-optation were the alternatives the Spaniards necessarily deployed to contain the
damage. It is true that the deal was reached after the rebels “found themselves in a
corner,” but Garcilaso left the nature of this space undefined. He provided no
descriptions of clever Odyssean tricks, and the encomiums to Ursúa’s military prowess
were muted. In contradistinction to Aguado’s account, the settlement that ends the war is
not a selfless gift that Ursúa offered to his defeated foe.
Rather, Garcilaso described events as follows:
Pedro de Ursúa [was] a noble gentleman, a fine soldier, and a captain
who had made great conquests in New Spain … [A]s the Reverend Juan
de Castellanos writes, he went to live at Nombre de Dios, where Don
Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza found him and commissioned him to find and
apply a solution for the havoc wrought by the fugitive Negroes called
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cimarrones, who live in the mountains and come down to the roads to
attack merchants and travelers, stealing their goods and killing many of
them. This had become so intolerable that it was impossible to travel
unless in parties of twenty or more. And the number of Negroes was
increasing daily, for having such an asylum it was easy for them to run
away without the slightest danger from their owners.
In order to clarify what Castellanos says (he mentions nothing of this), we
must explain that Pedro de Ursúa raised a force to conquer the
cimarrones—a word from the language of the natives of the Windward
Islands—enlisting many of Francisco Hernández Giron’s men who had
either fled or been exiled to those parts, and the viceroy pardoned all who
took part in the expedition. When the Negroes found themselves in a
corner, they asked for terms. To restore peace, which was very necessary,
all those who had hitherto fled from their masters were given their
freedom, since their masters had lost them in any case. In return the
cimarrones were obliged to hand over any who fled in the future or to pay
what their masters asked for them; any Negro who was maltreated by his
or her master could be freed by paying his master what he had cost him,
and the Negroes were to establish themselves in places where they could
live as settlers and residents, and not remain scattered in the wilderness.
They could trade with the Spaniards as they wished. All this was agreed
by both sides, so that they could live in peace. The Negroes gave sufficient
hostages and thus guaranteed the treaty. Their king, called Ballano, came
in person to deliver the hostages, but he himself remained as a permanent
hostage, for they refused to release him. The poor Negro was taken to
Spain, where he died.45
Garcilaso’s account in outline generally agreed with Aguado and Ortiguera, and
became source material for the composite, standard version of the events – the one
encapsulated by Alsedo’s dictionary entry. However, the details of Garcilaso’s narrative
set it apart from the others as a distinctive minority view. Vallano came under Ursúa’s
power through a final ruse, after the two had agreed to a peace. The African was not
described as having failed on the battlefield. The writer also evinced sympathy for
Vallano’s plight, referring to him pointedly as “the poor Negro.”
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Finally, alone amongst the chroniclers, Garcilaso described the provisions of the
peace treaty that ended the war in some detail, and made clear that many of the
provisions demanded by the cimarrones rather unselfishly dealt with the treatment of
those Africans who remained in slavery. In reading and pondering Garcilaso’s account of
the War, one might deduce that the rebel’s cause was actually a just one. In carefully
studying Garcilaso’s treatment of the War of Vallano, evidence is found for David
Brading’s contention that “[t]he Royal Commentaries of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega
should be interpreted as a carefully mediated, sustained rebuttal of the imperial tradition
of conquest history … .”46 In addition, cimarron-Spanish interactions in the 1570s
provide evidence that el Inca’s account accurately reflected the manner through which
imperial officials “subdued” Panamá’s rebellious Africans.47

The War after the ‘End’ of the War
The reports made by imperial officials, missionaries, and visitors to the isthmus of
Panamá in the generation following the ‘conclusion’ of the War of Vallano provide
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confirmation of Garcilaso’s account. Consistent complaints of a continuing cimarron
problems appear in these writings.48 Although the triumphalist chroniclers clearly
described Pedro de Ursúa as having restored a lasting peace to the region, later visitants
found the region still quite ‘infested’ with marauding cimarrones. Rather than a one-time
event with a single solution, marronage in Panamá had not been vanquished in 1556 with
the defeat of Vallano. Philip II’s own cosmographer would report, in a geographical
survey of the Indies produced at the instigation of the monarch, that “many black
cimarrones live in [Panamá]; in the year 1574 it is said that they number 3,000 and more,
and that they freely live and operate there without any means available to overpower
them due to the conditions of the land.”49
Spanish officials’ deployment of negotiation as a means to achieve the
pacification and concentration of several bands of rebel Africans into Christian towns
would serve as a model for officials on the empire’s frontiers. Since experience had
shown that a single, climatic battle would not decide the issue, a long-term, gradualist
policy was pursued. My conclusion is that on the imperial frontiers Spanish officials
were following a ‘Garcilasan’ solution, while working to frame and describe their actions
in as ‘triumphalist’ a vein as rhetoric might allow.50 The Panamá section of the Archivo
General de Indias contains numerous folders containing documents produced by colonial
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officials reporting to the Crown the results of their continuing negotiated settlements with
cimarron leaders.51
During a period of particularly heavy foreign intrusion after 1570, officials in
Panamá City negotiated peace agreements with the self-proclaimed leaders of several of
the cimarron communities in Panamá. As a result of these treaties, the pacified rebels
were bound by oath to cease hostile operations against the Spanish and to reduce
themselves to live in a civil, Christian fashion in newly chartered towns. The leaders
who accepted these terms were commissioned as the heads of the new towns, and granted
colonial offices and salaries. In return, the towns were expected to muster reliable militia
forces that could bolster the region’s defenses against foreign intruders. Although some
of the African leaders accepted the new colonial offices, seeing them as something
beneficial to both themselves and their people, others opposed the new system and
remained active rebels. Still others accepted, only to reject their positions and return,
with their people, to their prior status.
Through this process, a self-selected portion of the cimarron movement accepted
incorporation into the Spanish empire. By the same token, local Spanish officials
accepted that their realms were multi-racial and diverse. Of course, they hoped to change
this, since their belief was that, upon becoming urbanized and Christianized, the pacified
Africans who signed the treaties had literally changed their identities. Upon accepting
“reduction” and “pacification,” they ceased to be slaves and cimarrones. Conversely,
local officials no longer referred to them as Africans.
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Those cimarron leaders who transformed themselves from African rebels into
alcaldes and cabildo members also worked to convince the Spanish that their people had
become Christianized subjects of the Crown. The nature of these continuing SpanishAfro-Panamánian relationships, and the changing perceptions and identities underpinning
them, are questions of great historical interest.
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